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INTRODUCTION
The purposes of this briefessay are to outline for nonspecialists interested
in the Japanese economy thereasons for its rapid growth during thepast
thirty years and to speculateon the course the Japanese economy will take
during the coming few decades.Itis hoped that the first task will be
accomplished with a degree of detachment,given the perspective to be
gained by examininga period of thirty years and that the second will be
useful because an effort will be madeto report an emerging consensus of
scholarly opinion. In attemptingto achieve both these goals, the works of
colleagues in Japan and in thiscountry were freely enlisted. But even with
their assistance, the audacityof accepting an impossible assignment
writing a retrospect anda prospect of the postwar Japanese economy in a
brief essayexacts its just dues.The most that can be accomplished is to
sketch the barest outline of thepast and to hint at a possible course in the
near future from a relativelynarrow perspective. Readers interested in a
further examination ofany specific aspect of the observations and evaiva
tions made in thisessay must look to the appended bibliography.
NOTE Footnotes have been keptto a minimum, as the bibliography provides sources for
readers wishing to follow upon any specific point. Readily available government sources
Contain most of the data used inthis essay.Iwill be happy to respond to any query
concerning data used in this essay. Readers interested in an overview and exceptionaU'
Competent analyses of various aspects of the postwar economic grosvlh of Japan are referred
to Hugh 1. Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, eds., Asias New GiantHow the Japanese Economy





A retrospect on the postwar Japanese economy must beginwith an
examination of its most notable characteristic, one to which I havealready
referredthe rapid and sustained growth. Thoughmany of the figuresare
well known, a few are worth repeating here. The realgrowth rate was7.5
percent for the 1950-1955 period, 9.1 percent for the1955-1960 period,
9.8 percent for the 1960-1 965 period, 12.1percent for the 1965-1970
period, and 8.6 percent for the 1970-1973 period.A handy figureto
remember is that the growth that started after theKorean War averaged
over 10 percent for two decades. Before 1973-1974, whenJapan suffered
from the "oil shock," theaverage growth rate of even the fiverecession
years was 3.9 percent, which is better than theaverage growth rate of the
United Stales for the entire postwar period. Thesuperrapid growth is ako
evident in terms of Japan'sown economic history which distinguishesitself
for sustained growth. "In 1946 GNPper capita in constant prices was back
to the level of the early 1 920's. In less thanten years, the prewar peak of
1939 was regained. After 1955 eachyear was filled with economic growth
comparable to two years' growth by theprewar standard" 148, p.76]. With
population growing atan average annuaie of only 1 .03 percent during
the 1953-1969 period,per capita GNP rose at a rate of just about9 percent.
How and why was suchsuperrapid growth attained? Inattempting to
suggest some general answers to this largequestion, let us avail ourselves
of the calculations made byRosovsky and Ohkawa [44]on the relative
contributions made by several factorsof growth. The results ofcalculations do not tell us why therapid growth continued, butthey can tell us "the
sources of growth," that is, which factorcontributed how much topostwar growth, thus aidingus in asking the right questions.
1. Technological Change
The most significantpoint to be noticed in Table1is that the adjusted
residual was the largestsource of growth in the nonagriculturalsectors during the 1955-1961period, in which the superrapidannual growth rate of 13.04 percentwas achieved and that the size ofthe residual remained
important_accountingfornearly one-third of thecontinuingrapid growth_into the earlyyears of the l960s. Thus, the firstquestion we must ask is, Whywas technological change,which undoubtedly accounted for the most of theadjusted residual,so rapid in postwar Japan? Theanswer consists of four parts:
a.War devastation, whichmade possible adoption ofnew technology on a large scale;SOURCE:[44, pp. 47 and 68].
Availability of a large back!og of Western technology at relatively
low cost;
Active and numerous government policies that promoted and en-
couraged the adoption of new technology;
Rapid diffusion of new technology, which was encouraged by the
rapidity of the growth itself and by the ability to make improvements on
imported technology.
War DevastationJapan lost more than a quarter of her industrial capacity
to bombardments, and what she had left in 1945 was an overdepreciated
capital stock that was technologically backward. In fact, ever since the
Japanese invasion of Manchuria, in 1931, Japan's technological change
had slowed visibly. Then came World War II, and as Milton Friedman is
supposed to have said, "The best way to grow rapidly is to have the
country bombarded." As the recovery began and postwar growth was
initiated, Japan was in a position to adopt new technology without waiting
for assets to be fully depreciated. The rapidity of the adoption of new
technology perhaps isbest seen, along with the magnitude of capital




1.Growth rate of output
2.Contribution of growth rate of
13.04% 12.71%
gross capital stock
3.Contribution of growth rate of
2.82 4.24
labor
4.Total contribution of inputs
3.46 2.86
(line 2 + line 3) 6.28 7.10
5.Ratio of contribution of inputs to
growth rate of output
(line 4/line 1) 48.20 55.90
6.Growth rate of residual
(line 1 less line 4) 6.75 5.61
7.Residual after adjusting for
quality and utilization rate of
inputs 4.56 5.10
8.Relative contribution to growth
rate of:
Adjusted capital 34.7 38.9
Adjusted labor 30.2 28.6
"Residual" 35.1 32.5I
investment (which will he discussed shortki in theaerage age of capital
stock in )apn, 11.66yearsi: 1953 nd 11.051960. Comparablefigures for the United Statesare 15.6 for 1950 and 14.7 in 1960 [44.p.62).
New TechnologyThe abundant supply of new technologyat a relativel,
low cost was available tosatisiy the voracious appetiteof Japanese
industry. Counting only thosecontracts for which the life extendedover a
year and for which royalty was paid in foreigncurrency, 454 contractsto import new technologywere signed during the 1 950I 954 period,and the
figure rose steadily to 575 for1955-1959, to 2,039 for 1960-1964and to 3,926 for 1965-1969 [148,p. 41]. The royalty payments rose at anannual average rate of 30 percent during the 1950-1961period, only to taper off
to an annual growth rate of 10percent after 1961. On this rapidtechnolog- ical induction during the1950-1962 phase, Allen [7,p. 109] notes'
Between 1950 and 1962, 1,998contracts for technical cooperation hadbeen signed with foreignfirms, nearly two-thirds of themAmerican. Most of the
contracts related to projects in industriesthat have grown especially fast,notably iron and steel, petrochcrncaJschemical engineering, electronicsand motor manufacturing. The resultwas that by the earls 1960s the technicalgap had been virtually closed in most branchesof industry and Japanese firmswere themselves beginning to deviseimportant innovation.
The number ofcontracts signed, however, is onlya partial indicator of the Japanese efforts to innovate."In 1963, about 210,000abstracts of foreign scientific paperswere made by the JapanInformation Center forScience and Technology. Japanesebusinessmen andgovernment officials are con- stantly visiting foreigncountries to pick upnew ideas" [33,p. 61]. And 1963, it should be noted,was no different fromany other postwar year.
Favorable Government PolicyThe process of rapidtechnological change was vigorously aided by thegovernment, which adopteda wide variety of policies to assist, directlyand indirectly, in theadoption of new technol- ogies by industries.Though detaileddiscussion 0 eachpolicyisnot feasible here, the followingwere some of the policiesadopted:
a.Beginning in 1948 andthroughout the I950s, thegovernment made low-cost capital (loansat below-market rates)available to electric, iron and steel, coal, shipping,and other industriesin order to aid therapid "ra- tionalization" of theirtechnology. Becausesuch government loansap- proached 30percent of the total capitalacquired for the expansion of capacity and rationalizationduring the severalyears before and after the Korean War, theeffects of thesedirect loanswere significant during the recovery and the early phaseof postwareconomic growth. And the policy
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diminished level, throughout the1 960s.
b,Throughout the postwar period, the basic monetary policywas to
maintain "cheap money," except during brief and occasional interludes of
"tight money" necessitated by international payment deficit crises. "The
long-term objective of monetary policy was to supply growing industries
with low-cost funds created by the Bank of Japan" [126, p. 276]. In
functional terms, the policy manifested itself in the forms of (i) "overbor-
rowing" by corporate business,i.e.,for the 1950--1970 period, only
one-third of aggregate investment was financed internally (by retained
earnings and depreciation allowance), while the remaining two-thirds were
financed externally (by loans and trade credits); (ii) "overloans" by banks,
i.e., a "permanent state of over-borrowing by the commercial banks from
the Bank of Japan called forth by the banks' credit extension to corporate
business" [126, P. 248]; and (iii) rigid and administered interest rates.
The basic strategy of fiscal policy has been "easy money with a
surplus budget" to the extent possible. Revenues were purposely underes-
timated, and budgetary needs were met by taking a declining share of the
GNP through taxes because of the rapidly expanding tax base. "In aggre-
gate, the public sector has financed most of its investment internally, from
tax and nontax current revenues and from government enterprise cleprecia-
tion allowances. This was a consequence of the policy decision to give first
priority to private demand, especially business investment, in a period
when it was very strong" [200, p. 354].
Tax policy aided rapid technological change in two ways. One was
through generous depreciation provisions, asset revaluation, and numerous
tax deductions for corporate business. The effective tax rate on corporate
income fluctuated within a range of 19 to 22 percent (compared to a range
of 27 to 31 percent in the United States). Most of the provisions were so
phrased that the larger and more rapidly growing firms were able to enjoy
a lower effective tax rate than smaller and slower-growing firms.The other
was (and is) through a de facto decline in the progressivityof personal
income taxation through such means as total or partial exemptionof
interest and dividend incomes from taxation. The effective tax ratesfor
those making an income five times as large as the average family was
around 23 percent, and for those making an income ten times aslarge,
about 35 percent (compared to 43 and 57 percent for comparable income
brackets in the United States). The taxatior. policy, in effect, kept clearof
measures likely to curb industrial invment anddamage personal incen-
tives.
The risks involved in the expansion of capacity throughthe adoption
of newer (and invariably "lumpier") technology were substantiallyreduced
and the competition which could threaten the profit level wasminimized
A Retrospect and Prospect onthe Postwar Japanese Economy 257through the "administrative guidance" of the Ministryof International
Trade and Industry (MITt) and a major amendment of theAnti-Monoly
Act in 1953. Both the MITI guidance and the amendmentpermitted, de
facto and de jure, various types of collusive activity.Lax enforcementof
the Anti-Monopoly Act and permission liberally grantedto the largest firms
seeking to merge further facilitated the rapid adoptionof new technology.
1.The government also took the initiative indisseminating information
relating to new technology, in promotinggovernment-financed research,
and in making investments in endeavorscomplementary to the adoptionof
new, larger-scale technology (such as the establishmentof industrialzones and related social overhead facilities).
Diffusion of Technological ChangeThe last important factorcontributing
to the rapidity of technological change is theobvious fact that therate of
technological adoption and diffusion tendsto be rapid in a rapidlygrowing economy. Ako important, though quantitativeevidenceisdifficultto obtain, is that importentechnologies have often beensignificantly im-
proved by the Japanese themselves.According to a survey madein 1962, about 9,500 large firmsreported that they spentas much as one-third of
their research and developmentexpenditures on "modifyingand perfect- ing the imported technique"and, on average, about fourtimes more is spent on imported technology thenon indigenous technology in orderto improve "production engineeringand laying out of the capitalfacilities." Through such efforts,itis often said, importedtechnologies have been made as muchas 20 percent more "efficient" thanthe same technology used in the nations whereit was invented.(Systematic and quantitative research on this point isyet lacking, but both Japaneseand Western executives readily acknowledgethe general validity ofsuch an assertion.)
2. Capital Accumulation
Table 1 reveals thatanother questionwe should ask is, Whywas capital accumulation so rapid? Theincrease in capital adjustedfor quality change accounted for about 35to 40 percent of thegrowth of output, and
productivityrajsing technologicalchange could ofcourse not have been possible had it not beenfor the rapidlyincreasing supply of capital.The annual average ratioof gross fixedinvestment, excludinginventories, to GNP for the1953-1965 periodwas 28.3 percent. Thecomparable figure for the UnitedStates for thesame period was 17.9;for the United Kingdom, 1 5.7; forWest Germany, 23.3;and for France, 18.9.The ratio of gross domestic fixedinvestment togross domestic product forJapan was well over 30percent and oftenexceeded 35 percent duringthe twenty years following the KoreanWar [44,pp. 279 and 293].
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YarnjMotivation for the rapid investment is obvious. One way to express that
motivation is to say that the economy was driven to achieve a high rate of
investment by the need to restock the war-torn economy, by the desire to
dose the technological gap in order to increase productivity and to
increase international competitive ability, and by the profitability of in-
creasirigly capital-intensive heavy-chemical industries. Another way of
stating the motivation is to say that the marginal productivity of capital was
extremely high and the returns from investments remained high and even
rose, aided by the correspondingly larger derived demand, or "in Japan,
investment was the driving force for growth" [44, p147].
In discussing the relationship between rapid capital formation and the
superrapid growth, we should note in particular that Japanese investment
was concentrated more in output-increasing ventures undertaken by rap-
idly growing manufacturing industries, rather than cost-reducing ones, as
were those in the United States. Compared to other countries, a sig-
nificantly smaller fraction of capital in Japan was allocated to such invest-
ments as housing arid other social overhead capital. This is why lchimura
observed that the Japanese economy devoted "an unusually high propor-
tion of gross national product to productive fixed-capital formation" and
allocated it "intensively in export industries or capital goodisi industries"
so as to achieve "a high rate of economic growth" (198, p. 2721.
What enabled the sustained and large investments, without causing more
than a modest and tolerable inflation (despite the consistent easy money
policy) and without making the nation depend on foreign borrowing to any
significant degree, was the high rate of saving achieved by the Japanese.
The ratio of personal saving to disposable income during the 1959-1970
period averaged as high as 18.3 percent in contrast to 12 percent in
Germany and 7 to 8 percent both in the United States and the United
Kingdom. Why do the Japanese save so much? The question has interested
many economists and, as a consequence, many answershave been of-
fered. Though no one can claimespecially after some intense debates
to have found a definitive answer, the following factors, invarying combi-
nations and with varying emphasis, have been presented as explanations
for the high rate of saving in postwar Japan [61] [301:
Savings tend to be large because real income hasbeen rising rapidly
while Japanese consumption patterns (taste) have laggedbehind.
The semiannual lump-sum bonus payments, which arecustomary
in Japan, tend to be viewed as transitory income by theirrecipients.
Because of the nenko joretcu system (a wagelevel geared more to
seniority than to merit or productivity) and changes in the agecomposition
of employees (the proportion of older employees was risingbefore the
early 1960s), there was a tendency for savings to increase.
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The Japanese have had a desire to accumulatewealth becausetheir
ratio of financial assets to income is still low (about halfthat of theUnited States in 1970).
Target savings for housing, education, and high-cost
consumer dura-
bles, especially because personal financinginstitutions are notyet de- veloped in Japan, have raised totalsavings.
Since social welfare programs have beenrelatively neglectedper- sonal savings are needed for oldage and unforeseen expenditures.
The increasing labor participationrate,i.e.,the increasein the number of income-earners withinfamilies, has also contributedto increas- ing savings.
The tax systemencourages savings: the exemptionor generous
deduction of interest income fromthe tax base is permitted.
I.Finally, many see a culturallyingrained tradition of thrift.
Analytically speaking,some of these factors overlap, andevidence questioning the significance ofsome suggested factors has beenadvanced. The positions takenon this important "savings question"range from Rosovsky and Ohkawa's, whichholds that "savingsare consideredan essentially independentprocess whose key determinanare the rate of growth and the level ofincome" [44, p.1 72] to the morewide-based institutionally oriented explanationsoffered by Komiya,Kanamori, Mizo- guchi, and other Japanesescholars.1
3. Contribution by Labor
Nexttotechnologyandcapital,labor__adjustedfor"quality"
improvements__has contributedmost to postwar Japanesegrowth (see Table 1), accounting fornearly 30 percent of it.The reasons includethe following:
The ample supply oflabor (contributingfactors included thenearly 6 million returnees fromthe former Japaneseempire plus demobilizedsol- diers, the postwarbaby boom,migration from theagricultural sector, the increasing labor forceparticipation rate, etc.)prevented wages from rising rapidly. During the1 950s, wagesrose less than labor productivityand, for most of the1 960s, productivitykept pace withwage increases. This sharplyContrasts with theexperience of thepast twenty years in both Europe and theUnited States, wherewages have risen more thanproduc- tivity.
The proportionof youngmen and women in thelabor force rose during the 1 96O,and this had theeffect ofpreventing increases inwages because of thenenkö joretsusystem. Thepresence of the young, whoseRetrospeCt and Prospect on the Postwar Japanese Economy 261
wages under this system tended to be lower than their productivity, and of
women, who wereusually outside the system, helped industryobtain more
labor at a lower cost.
Laoor moved from low-productivity to high-productivitysectors. For
example, between 1950 and 1965, the number of agricultural workers
declined by 4.6 million and the share of labor in forestry, agriculture, and
fishing fell from 42 to 26 percent [33, P. 52]. Small firms employing
between 1 and 9 persons accounted for a quarter of the total labor force in
1950 but for only 16 percent by 1963, and the percentage is still steadily
declining.
Enterprise unionism, as several quantitative studies show,2 did not
exert a wage-boosting effect. As union membership failed to rise above 30
percent of the labor force and as the major unions formed within the
largest firms, in effect sharing in the oligopolistic profits of those firms, the
economywide impact of enterprise unionism was minimized.
The quality of labor,if recent research findings are correct,rose
steadily through education, on-the-job training, and various improved
management techniques. Among the beneficial effects of the improving
quality of labor is considered to have been its role in "increasing the
country's capability to absorb new methods from abroad" [44, p. 551.
Finally, the culturally ingrained traditions of loyalty, intergroup com-
petitiveness (interfirm or even between sections within a firm), and the
willingness to work "long and hard" should not be ignored. Economists
shun the subject because of its relative intractability. However, Japan is the
only industrialized nationin which the Ministry of Labor has had to
admonish employees who are reluctant to take all the vacation due them
and where many salaried employees ("salarymen') work well in excess of
forty hours per week without extra compensation as a matter of course.
4. The Role of International Trade
While the preceding descriptions of technology, capital, and labor may be
helpful in depicting the importance of those chief factors, crucial questions
remain: Why did Japanese exports, which are often considered an impor-
tant factor in Japan's postwar growth, increase so rapidly? And to what
extent did international trade contribute to postwar growth? These ques-
tions are important in their implications for the world economy (and
especially for japanese-Asian and Japanese-United States economic and
political relations), in helping us better to understand the nature of Japan's
postwar growth, and in enabling us to anticipate the future course ofthe
Japanese economy.
As might be expected from the preceding discussion, the answer to the
first question is noncontroversial. The growth of Japanese exports in the1951-1965 period has beenphenomenal: the annualcompoundedper- centage growth rate in dollar valueswas 17.1, compauedtoI 1 .7 for Germany, 13.9 for Italy, 5.2for the United Kingdom,and 4.7 forthe United States.It was due, accordingto Kariamori, who speaksfor most students of Japaneseeconomy, to "the Japanese participationin the growth of the world trade, themaintenance of the terms of trade,and thereduction of unit labor coststhrough increased productivity.... The comparatively low price of Japaneseexports was an importantreason behind itsexport growth" [199,p. 309]. Kanamori's main pointis supported byU.N. statistics which show that theJapanese index of exportprices (1953= 100) stood at 86.1in 1965 compared to 110.0for Germany,118.5 for the United Kingdom,and 112.8 for the UnitedStates.
Japan's price competitivenesswas a product of increasedefficiency of production as wellas of Japans ability to shiftthe mix ofexports (i.e., productive capacity)to maintain pricecompetitiveness. "Duringthe 1950-55 period, themain contributors [torapid growth ofexports] were textiles and sundrygoods; during the1955-60 period,machinery and textiles; and[during] the 1960-65period, machineryand metals. Without this changein composition,Japanese exports probablywould not have achieved thespectacular growth of1 7 percentper year" [199,p. 312]. This, ofcourse, is an oversimplification.
The quotationonly hints at the gradual butsteady process ofchange which istaking place inthe product mix of theindustrial sectorin favor of heavyand chemical industries and whichis required if Japanis to stay aheadof its competitors in the internationalmarket [201].
In discussing thepostwar success ofJapanese exports,our observation must include theimportant role playedby thegovernment in promoting and actively aidingexports. Even ifwe grant the pricecompetitiveness of Japanese goodsas the mainreason for the rapidrate of growth ofexports and we recognizethe difficultiesinvolved inquantifying theexport. promoting contributionmade by variouspolicies, wecannot ignore the fact thata substantial fillipwas given to exporting
industries both directly and indirectlyby laws permittinggenerous tax deductionsfor overseas sales expenditures,preferential(low-cost and defactogovernment- guaranteed) loans,andnumerous forms ofcartel and othercollusive activities amongexport-relatedindustries. Thegovernment's foot-dragging in the liberalization
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especially of its industry has been high and well above
world averages and
not vice versa"[44, p.1 73]. They also believethat increasesin exports
"were madepossible by domestic factors such
as increased domestic
investment and an enlarged home market" [199, p. 319J, that is,the export
growth came about as a result of the growth of theeconomy, and what it
implies in terms of competitive ability is difficult to challenge.There are,
however, a few who suggest a closer look at the exporting
industries with a
view to moderating, but not denying, the majority view. Forexample,
Blumenthal has counseled a modification of the majorityview, based on
his findings that the inputs purchased by the exporting industriesper unit
of export have been declining since the early 1960s and that theexport-
oriented industries have had a higher rate of technological change
[60].
5. Other Important Factors Promoting Rapid Growth
Many other factors besides technology, capital, labor, and interndtjonal
trade contributed significantly to the superrapid growth of thepostwar
Japanese economy. Though a few of these factors have been referredto, or
at least discussed implicitly already, Ishallbriefly describe themore
important ones for the sake of those readers interested in amore broad-
based examination of the growth of the postwar Japaneseeconomy than
what could be attempted through the medium of the sources-of-growth
framework or other basically econometric approaches.
a.In addition to those growth-promoting policies which have already
been discussed in relation to taxation, investment, international trade, and
the areas of monetary and fiscal policies, two other kinds of government
activity are worth noting. The first involves implementation of a broad
range of policies affecting the industrial organization of postwar Japan, that
is,policies thatineffect have actively promoted oligopolistic market
structures in the name of strengthened international competitive ability,
technological change, and "stability of the market order." Legal and
"administrative" cartels have been tolerated, and "underground" collusive
activities of various types (exceeding 1,500 throughout the1 960s) have
gone unprosecuted. Mergers among the five largest firms in an industry
(such as in iron and steel and butter) have been approved even when that
meant that the dominance of the merged firm would result in a reduced
level of competitiveness in the market [501.
The second involves adoption of what might be termed a "domestic
demand maintenance policy," i.e.,one which keeps the total tax revenue
low (at around 20percent of GNP) reiative to other industrial nations
(United States, 27 percent; United Kingdom, 35 percent; and Denmark,
44 percent). Through specialegislation favoring the corporate sectors,increased basic exemptions for personal income taxes, andperiodic reduc-
tions in tax rates, total governmentrevenue has been designed to rise only
slowly, that is, because the rapidly growingeconomy provided a larger and
larger tax base, the governmentwas able to obtain more revenue without
increasing tax rates and even with reducedrates. After all, the nominal
GNP rose at an annual average rate of better than15 percent, and since
Japan relies heavily on income taxes, the elasticity of thecentral govern-
ment's revenue is well above unity. One of the effects of thispolicy clearly
was to maintain the level of demand for consumer goodsas well as to
encourage corporate investment.
In discussing postwar growth, one must not failto take note of the
importance of the Korean War boom, which injected muchneeded dollars
into the economy during the period of the "dollarshortage" and which in
effect primed the pump ofpostwar Japanese growth. The totalamount of
the "special war demand" of theU.N. forces met by the Japanese
industries was substantial (e.g., $592 millionin 1951 and in excess of $800
million for 1952 and 1953). The effectof the war demand on textiles,
cement, some iron and steel products,as well as others was, therefore,
sign ilicant in that profits made by theboom provided a part ofmuch
needed capital and the optimism requiredfor the industry rationalizatioi'i
plans initiated by MITI during themid-i 950s.
The declining trend of world marketprices of some of the important
raw materials and foodstuffs after the KoreanWar aided postwar growth
because it not only reducedinput costs but also helpedto alleviate the
potentially strangling effect ofa much larger international trade deficit. The
index of prices of imports (1965= 100) fell, as a trend, from 117.0 in 1953
to 97.7 in 1962.
Though its effect shouldnot be overrated, the allocation ofno more than1percent of GNP for national defense(thanks to the American
nuclear umbrella)isconsidered by some to have beena significant
contributing factor to Japan'ssuperrapid growth. Had Japan beenrequired to invest a larger proportion ofits GNP for nonproductivedefense pur-
poses, her growth, given the highmarginal productivity ofcapitalin
postwar Japan, would have beenreduced. This is especially thecase when we realize that Japan'sarmament industry would not have beenable to supply most of thesophisticated equipment neededby the Self-Defense Force.It would have beennecessary to buy those militarygoods, most likely Irom the UnitedStates, with the inevitableconsequence of weaken- ing Japan's trade balance.
A much debatedcharacteristic of theJapanese economy, theso- called dualistic structure,i.e.,the coexistence of large,technologically advanced firms and smalland medium-sizedtechnologically lagging firms,
I
264 Kozo Yamaniuracontributed on balance (between growthpromotjng pluses andgrowth
hibiting minuses) to the growth of the economy iii three ways First,
the
clearly priviieged largefirms were ahle to benefitfrom lowercosts of
capital. Economies of scale were fully realized because of the size ofthe
firms' market share.They were able to hire the best thelabor market hadto
offer, and enjoyed a hostof other advantages besides.Second the largest
firms had the ability tocushion fluctuations ineconomic conditions by
using the smaller,often subcontracting, firmsas a buffer, while maintain.
ing own returns toinvestment, morale of own labor,etc. Third, there
existed a market for older productive capacities which the largest firms
were anxious todiscard in order to get On to thenext technological
frontier.3
Mostly by their own initiative, the larger firms in postwar Japanmade
a conscious anddetermined effort to improve their managerialefficiency.
"The American model"such as the divisional structure and staff sections
attached to decision-making higher echelonswas actively imported be-
ginning in the mid-i 950s, and by the lateI 950s the largest firms had
adopted the system of "profit centers" within their firms to improve the
cost-accounting procedures within each division or branch. Much of the
'American model," however, was in effect grafted onto the Japanese
decision-making sytern, i.e., the ringi system (group decision-making by
consensus) and the jiyaku-kai (an executive committee that passes on
group decisions made at lower levels). The results of these grafts in most
circumstances were that the efficiency of managerial personnel was im-
proved, and firms were able to react to the swiftly changing economic
environment more rapidly than they hadbeen able to prior to their
Americanization [54] [55].
Finally, special mention must be made of the role played by the ten
general trading companies ri postwar growth. These giant traders, account-
ing for approximately half of both exports and imports, functioned as
efficient finders of markets for products and raw materials because of their
ability to gather economic intelligence through their network of branch
offices and one-man posts situated around the globe. In most instances,
these firms helped to minimize the risks involved in international trade for
the producers (especially small and medium-sized ones) and tochannel
credits which they obtained from the major banks to those producers who
might have had difficulty obtaining necessary capital on their own. Evi-
dence of collusion among these giant trading firms to fix commission
charges and otherwise exploit their oligopolistic market structure islimited.
It seems reasonable to say that this unique Japanese institutionplayed a
positive and significant role in promoting Japan's internationaltrade.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS
Kozo Yamamura
Economic growth continued even more rapidly during the 1965-1970
period (12.1 percent) than in the preceding five years (9.8 percent). Most of
the factors that contributed to the rapid growth of the postwar yearswere
still at work, but the most significant reason for the accelerating growth of
the 1965-1970 period was the increasing importance of such industriesas
plastics, power-generating machinery, chemical fibers and fabrics, office
machinery, automobiles, tape recorders, optical equipment, television,
etc., which steadily grew on the back of earlier investments and technolog-
ical change and which continued to rio so on the strength of further
investments and increasingly larger expenditures on each firm's R&D.
These were the industries that played a major role in doublingjapan's
labor productivity between 1960 and 1967 and in raisingii another 50
percent between 1967 and 1970.
Exports continued to increase, led by the products of those industries.
The rising world income level contributed to the steady increasein Japan's
exports. Also contributing were the Kennedy rounds, which reduced the
tariffs on the principal Japanese exports by approximately 35percent, and
the Vietnam War, which stimulated the demand forJapanese goods by the
Southeast Asian nations, Taiwan, and Korea. The primemover behind
Japan's continued success in the international market duringthis period
was again, as it has been since the mid-1950s, cost competitivenessof
japanese industries aided by the inflation which beganto plague Japan's
competitors. Japanese policymakerswere sanguine about Japan's econom-
ic future, as profit rates remained high and realwages continued steadily to
climb. Per capita income in Japan exceeded$2,000 in 1970.
The rapid growth of the latter half of the1 960s, however, was being
achieved by sweeping several increasinglyuncomfortable economic re-
alities under a rug of optimism, Whilethe rapid growth continued, the
bulges under the rugwere growing in size. One of the biggest bulgeswas
an increasingly serious labor shortage. Thisproblem, which appeared
during the early I 960s, continuedto grow worse during the latter half of
the decade because of the buoyanteconomic conditions and the delayed
effect of the rapidly declining fertilityrate following the brief postwar baby
boom. The wage differentialsbetweenthe newly employed(fresh
graduates of middle and high schoolsand of universities) and the most
senior employees narrowed becauseof the rising wage level of the former.
For new employees thewage differential between large arid small firms
narrowed, and by the mid-i 960s,smaller firms, able to offer lesspromising
future wages for seniority, oftenhad to pay even higherwages than the large firms to obtainnew employees. Bankruptciesamong small firms
increased, with rising laborcosts the prime reason. Mostimportant of all,
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the comfortable margin enjoyed during the l950s between
rates of in-
crease inabor productivity and the realwage disappeared,and by the
mid-1960S wage increases threatened to overtake theincreases in produc..
tivity. The postwar unions, long accustomed to Winninga large increase in
wages byoccasionally resorting to prolongedstrikes, weregrowing increas
ingly militant; and the new age, according to Japanese labor
economists, of
aggressive shuntunionism (industrywide ratherthancompanybasj Unions) was about to begin.
The MlTl oflicials continued to poor-mouth Japan'sposition in the world
economy in their efforts to ignore another increasingly large and
interna
tionaily visible bulge, i.e., a fundamental change inJapan's position in the
international economy during the second half of the1 960s; by 1969, few
doubted that the consistent and large trade surplus whichhad begun to
accumulate beginning in the mid-1960s was thereto stay. Even a govern-
ment agency predicted a steadily increasing surplus throughout the1970s.
The trade surplus in 1970 stood at $8 billion, anenormous sum for a
nation which had so long suffered chronic deficits anda hand-to-mouth
existence.
Despite gentle and not so gentle (the textile episode with theUnited
States) foreign urging and an increasingly visible inflationarypressure
resulting from the trade surplus, the government, which had worked forso
long and so hard to promote expotts before seeing a trade surplus, clungto
export-promoting policies, to the exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar set
in 1949, and to import duties on consumer goods which exceeded 35
percent. As late as October 1969, the government continued to retain
quota restrictions on 161 items (four-digit Brussels Tariff Nomenclature). In
the summer of 1970, a group of academic economists strongly urged the
adoption of a policy of allowing the yen to appreciate by about 10 percent
in small, discreet steps, i.e, the crawling peg. The recommendation gener-
ated a spirited discussion in academic, business, and financial com-
munities but no action by the government. The continued growth of
exports as reflected in the large trade surplus as well as the possibility of
continued and ever larger surpluses created or threatened to create serious
difficulties with several nations that were beginning to accumulate uncom-
fortably large trade deficits with Japan.
By the mid-1960s, and some would argue by the beginning of the
l960s, the unwelcome consequences of the government's policies favoring
industrial concentration constituted yet another unsightly bulge under the
rug. By 1970, at least 10 percent of the shares in 7,612 firms were owned
by the 100 largest firms thesame 100 owned at least 50 percentof the
shares in 2,818 of those firms). The degree of ownership control exerted by
the largest 100 firms hadmore than doubled since 1960.Mergers In-
creased steadily during the 1960s, especially during the latter half of thedecade, and an increasing proportion of thosemergers were carried ou
among the largest firms and were conglomerate innature. Cartels of
various types which were legal under eleven laws continuedto increase
during the 1960s, and "underground cartels,"too, increased, suffering little
or no prosecution.
Increasing concentration ratios, concentration ofownership control, and
legal and illegal cartels couldnot but affect the pricing and other behavior
of firms. Evidence steadily piledup showing that the frequency and
amplitude of price changeswere highly correlated with the market struc-
ture and the presence or absence of cartels.Export prices ofmany
commodities were significantly lower than thosecharged to domestic
consumers. (In December 1966, the Japanese FTC tooka rare action when
it brought charges of illegal price fixingagainst six television manufacturers
who charged domesticconsumers 190,000 yen for a1 9-inch television
while expoiting the identical productat 65,000 yen.) One need hardlybe
an economist of the Marxist persuasionto compile a long list of such
indictments.
The biggest bulge of them all, however,was a series of questions relating
to the social costs of rapid economicgrowth. By the mid-I 960s thepublic,
led by the press and academics,was voicing three demands. The firstwas that a variety of social welfareprograms be increased from the low levelo 6.2 percent of GNPas late as 1966 to the level of theindustrialized Western nations (13.8percent in the United Kingdom, 19.9percent in West Germany, and 15.0percent in ltly), and correspondingmore to the size of the GNP thenattained. The secondwas that efforts be made to
check the pollution of air,water, and the environment ingeneral, and this demand grew evenmore vocal as water and air pollutionwere confirmed
to have been the causes of illnessesand deaths in several affectedregions. The third was that suchgrowth-promoting (or assumedto be growth-
promoting) measuresas legal cartels, retail pricemaintenance laws, un- checked mergers betweenthe largest firms,etc., which contribute to gradually more unequaldistribution of asset income,be curtailed. These demandswere made by housewives whobegan to mobilize nationwide women'sorganizations; by oppositionparties, on economic and ideological grounds;and by the mass media,which constantly fea- tured academics criticalof government policies.The Sato cabinet enacted various antipollutionmeasures and increased socialwelfare budgets in response to these demandsHowever, thesemeasures fell considerably short of those demandedand failed to quellthe increasingly articulate voices of the dissatisfied. In bothlocal and nationalelections, the incum- bent Uberal-DemocraticParty (LDP) continuedto lose ground during the l960s.
While rapid growthcontinued and theeconomy remained buoyant, the
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policymakers chose to ride on the momentum, hoping for the
best. Despite
the rapidlydccunlulating liade surplus, MITI showedno sign of changing
the policies "tostrengthen the internationalcompetitive ability ofJapanese
firms"; and, after all, there was as yet no political party sufficiently
strong
to wrest powerfrom the conservatives (the LDP).
Both the Japanese government and industry, which ignoredthe academ-
ics and chose to ride on the momentum of growth, were, however,rudely
jolted by the Nixon shokku (shock) of August 15, 1971. Aspart of his "new
economic policy," the U.S. President suspended the convertibilityof the
dollar into gold, imposed a surcharge of 10 percent on importson a
temporary basis, and made it known that the dollar would be devalued.
Indicating the strength of its desire to maintain the 360:1 exchangerate,
the Bank of Japan reacted to the new American policy by buyingas much
as $4.5 billion duringthe several days following the shokkuto maintain the
yen-dollar rate. And even vs'henthe yen was forced to floatshortly
thereafter, the bank continued to intervene to prevent the sharp upward
revaluation of the yen, and the policy of the "dirty float"WdS continued
into December. The end of indecision on the part of the Japanese
policymakers came at the Smithsonian Institution on December 18, when
the Japanese were forced to revalue the yen by 16.88 percent, although the
"last offer" the Japanese Finance Minister was instructed to makewas 14
percent.
Despite dire predictions of what would follow such a drastic revaluation
and despite a brief panic at the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the trade surplus
continued to rise. Though much of the cost competitiveness was lost by the
revaluation, Japan was still able to increase its exports (surprising some
econometric forecasters) because of aggressive sales efforts, established
dictribution channels, and willingness to trim profits. Thus, by the end of
1972, many began to speak of revaluation of the yen. and the Bank of
Japan, wishing to prevent another revaluation, continued to buy dollars in
order to maintain the new rate of 308 yen to the dollar. Because of the
clollat purchases and the accumulating trade surplus, the Japanese dollar
reserve by the beginning of 1973 exceeded $19 billion, an embarrassingly
huge figure.
The U.S. trade position continued to deteriorate despite the devaluation,
and the dollar was devalued again in mid-February 1973. Japan agreed at
this time, under strong pressure from the United States and also wishing not
to increase its already huge dollar reserves, to float the yen at its market
level. The outcome was a rate of 265 yen to the dollar, or a de facto 24.7
percent appreciation of the yen vis--vis the rate of only two years
previously. The effect of the new "clean float" (or relatively cleaner) went
beyond that of the 308:1 rate. A number of small and medium-scale firms
which largely dependedon export markets wereforced to reduce output oreven to go into bankruptcy. The trading companies forecasta gloomy
future even for the major exporters.
The year 1973, however, hadyet another shokku in store for the
Japanese economythe oil shokku. The effects of thatshock, addedto
those of the appreciation of theyen and the new government policyto
promote imports (which was adopted during the spring),are not yet all in.
The final accounting of 1973 isnow being made, and the official statistics
of the first two quarters of 1 974are still being revised. But a few factsare
evident. Japanese imports in 1973rose by a whopping 71 percentcom-
pared to a 29 percent increase inexports. The major cause of the increase
in imports was the suddensurge in imports of consumer goodsencouraged by the new exchangerate and new government policies, suchas the
reduction of quotas and tariffs (of 164quota-restricted items inOctober 1968, only 74 remainedso restricted by October 1974). A rapidinflation
was another major fact of 1973. Theconsumer price index (1970 100)
rose from 114.5 to 135.1 during theyear, and the wholesale price index,
too, showed a large increase of 36.5points. Delayed revaluation ofthe
yen, which contributed to excess liquidity withinthe economy (at the end of 1973, dollarreserves still stood at over $13 billion), and highoil prices
were two major factors in the inflationand rising labor costs, thoughby no means the only ones.
While some forecasta real growth rate of as muchas 4.8 percent for
1974, the statistical evidenceon hand is as yet difficult to evaluate.Both the CR1 and WPIare still rising rapidly, as is thewage level, The dollar
reserves are being reduced at therate of $1 billion per month, and theyen
rate is fluctuating at about 300 to thedollar. A tight money policy hasbeen continued, but signs ofan increase in exports began toappear after the midyear.
[POSTSCRIpT: Even the low (byJapanese standards) growthrate of 4.8 percent was not achieved in1974. According toa preliminary official
report, the economy experiencedits first postwar negativegrowth, approx- imately 3 percent. Whatsurprised the forecasterswas the continued and
increasingly large reductionin industrial outputseen during the second half of theyear. Output for June 1974was only 1 .9 percent below that of
June 1973, but by Decemberoutput was more than 1 5percent below' that of the year before. Atthe same time, becauseof the tight monetary policy adopted and therecession, the rate ofincrease in prices has moderated
significantly. The WPI isnow (early months of 1975)rising only at an annual rate of slightlyabove 10 percent, andthe CR1 is risingat about 15 percent. International tradefared relativelyveIl and has registereda consistent surplus during thepast several months. Thereserve now exceeds $14 billion.
In short, Japan in thespring of 1975continues to be in the grip of
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stagflatiofl. The likelihood of the new Mki Cabinet
rea'izing its goalsfor the yeara realgrowth rate of 4,3percent and inflationof less than10 percent_-_aPPeaIs shm. \'Vhile VarIOUS forecastsare being made ofthe magnitude of new orders to be placed following the
completion of inven-
tory adjustmentsand the hoped forrecovery of the U.S.economy, the "spring offensive" continues to succeed in winning
wage settlements exceeding levels "advised" by the governmentThough thecurrent stag flation defies confident forecasting (the Japanesesituationis no more tractable than that of the United States),one thingisCertain:if the economy fails to recover soon, the less than rosy
prospect envisioned for the future of the japanese economy in the following
pages needs to be touched up with a few more strokes of pessimism,
A PROSPECT
Perhaps based on the wisdom that no economycan continue to growat
the superrapid rate which the Japanese economy hasmaintained, a widely
he'd expectation is that the growth rate of the economywill decelerate
during the coming decades. Most econometric modelsand business and
government experts forecast an average growth rate of 6.5to 7.5 percent
during the 1970-1990 period, with the 1990rate at about 4 percent. This
projected decline in the growth rate of from about10-11 percent to 4
percent is based on estimated trends (extrapolations adjusted forknown
factors or expected shifts in parameter values), and formost economists, it
appears "reasonable." That is to say, a new model which is significantly
different from those used up to now will requireassumptions or estimates
which would command less agreement than those madeor used in the
current models.
No attempt can be made here to evaluate eachor even some of the
models used in making the projections.Isuggest, however, that the
consensus is perhaps optimistic for two major reasons. One is that the
projections were made before the full impact of the oil crisiswas felt, and
the other is that assumptions and simple trend adjustments often madein
the models tend to fail to incorporatesome economic changes that cannot
be readily accommodated byeconometric modeling and social and politi-
cal factors thatmay have a profound impact on the basic economic
variables used in the models.
Rosovsky and Ohkawa, writing in 1972 before the oil crisis, noted that
"by the end of thisdecade,itislikely that Japan's rate of growth of
aggregate output will have fallen from its postwar rate of 10 percent to
somewhere in the neighborhood of 6.5 percent" [44, p. 248]. While itisquite possible that their onger terrii projection for the 1970-1990 period
could come true, the important fact to be noted is that, through no fault of
theirsinasmuch as the oil crisis erupted after that passage was written
even usually optimistic business groups expect the economy to grow ata
rate well below 5 percent in 1974 and about 7 percent in 1975. Thus, the
growth rate has much catching up to do ciuring the latter half of the1970s
to reach the Rosovsky-Ohka'a prediction.It should also be noted that
mean real growth for 1970-1973 came to only 8.6 percent.
Of course, itis patently unfair to ask any model to perform as well after
introducing an exogenous 5hokku. The only point being made hereis that
the projections must be scaled down somewhat. Accordingto the Eco-
nomic Planning Agency, 58 percent of the increase in the WPI duringthe
second half of 1973 was contributed by increases in importprices; the
comparable figure was 44 in the first half of 1974. Though theeffect of
import price rises on the WPI is estimated to decline during thesecond half
of 1974, iiis uncertain how rapidly it will decline thereafter.Since the
same EPA study found that 42 to 51 percent of the increases inthe CPI
during 1973 and the first half of 1974were due to increases in the WPI, the
impact of the increases in import prices, led byan increase of more than
four times in the oil price,on the current inflation in Japan must be fully
recognized in the context of the rapidly changingJapanese economy.
Though itis not possible in thisessay to trace the significance of the
increases in import prices onnumerous other aspects of the economy, it
should be pointed out that Japan imports99.7 percent of the crude oil she
consumes and that Japanese imports account for1 5.9 percent of total oil
imports of crude oil by the OECD(Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) countries. Thesame figures for iron ore are 99.3 percent
and 42.3 percent; formanganese ore, 91.9 and 32.3; and forcopper ore,
94.2 and 77.1. Japan imports 100percent of the lead ore, bauxite, wool,
and cotton she requires; importsof these goods into OECDcountries
account for from 12.3 to 35.5 percent of thosecountries' needs.
The actions of the OPEC(Organization of Petroleum ExportingCoun-
tries) cartel may not indicate thepattern of the future, but itis nevertheless
essential to attempt to analyze,to the extent possible, the effectof the
possibly sharp increases inprices (and even embargoesby exporting nations) of naturalresourcesin projecting the futureof the Japanese
economy. Given the nature of theproblem involved, that task willbe
exceedingly difficult, but it shouldbe faced squarely, becausewithout a
realistic appreciation of the fragilityof the Japaneseeconomythe virtual absence of vital rawmaterialsit is impossibleto project the course of the
economy with any degree ofsuccess. In addition,itisimpossible to understand the seeminglyexcessive concern of Japanesepolicymakers in promoting the internationalcompetitive ability of Japaneseindustry and
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The decline in the growth rate and inflation accompanied by aboj
shortages and a reduced rate of increase in labor productivity willinevita-
bly worsen the current tension between labor unions andmanagement
As already noted, the initial signs of increasing combativeness of labor
unions have already surfaced. Thus, itis quite reasonable to assume that
industrywide American-type unionism will increase and that labordisputes
in the near future will be increasingly bitter and prolonged. Once thistrend
begins,itis likely that the strong ideological orientation (absent inthe
United States) of the Japanese unions could seriouslyaggravate labor
problems. Perhaps economic theory has considerablymore predictive
power on labor mobility in Japan during the coming decades thanI am
prepared to accept, but itis also possible that the projection is quite wide
of the mark.
Negative Effects of Foreign PoliticalReactions
and International Financial Instability
In all the models, projections of the futuregrowth rate of Japanese exports
have been made on the basis ofeconomic factors atone. Productivity
increases (terms of trade) and investments alongwith the projected growth
rate of world trade (income) are the major determinantsof export growth.
Even leaving aside the oil question, whichwe have already touched upon,
one cannot but be pessimistic in evaluating the long-runlikelihood of
Japan's best customers and the worldmarkets absorbing the growing
industrial output of Japan ata rate sufficient to assure a mean growthrate
of 6.5 to 7.5 percentper year for the next two decades.
The favorable conditions that madeit possible for the Japaneserate of
technological change to far exceedthat of her major competitors haveall
but disappeared; Japan's industrialcompetitors will be increasingly ableto
inhibit the continued incursionof Japanese goods into their homeniarkets. For political as wellas economic reasons, Japan'scustomers inless
developed regions are, with fewexceptions, highly concerned aboutthe prolonged trade deficit withJapan and with increasingJapanese invest- ments.
Occasional expressions ofanti-Japanese sentiment in theUnited States
press (usually well orchestrated by theAdministration), Europeanconcern
approaching undisguised feartoward Japaneseexports, and the riots of Thai students againstJapanese iniportsare all manifestations of rapidly
changing circumstances inthe world economywhich a growing Japan must face.
Japanese policymakers andindustry, which havemade significant efforts to realize "orderly marketing,"to reduce exports ofselected goods to several nations, and tocreate the eight-point importpromotion measures of
274 Kozo YamaniuraA Retrospectand Prospect on the Postwar Japanes
Economy 275
1972 and the revaluation, ako coiltinte to maintajiiexpirt promotion policies in the torm 01 nUmerous export cartek and
low-cost loans and
other subsidies to export-oriented industries. The l)aSicpolicy still iS to aid
exports by making only the necessary COnCeSSIOnS anda show of coopera-
tion. it would be naive to think that Japan can achieve
economic growth
during the coming decades without a substantial politicaland economic
conflict with her competitors and Customers. It is alsonaive to assume that
the projected course of growth will not 1e negativelyaffected by the
obvious difference between the world of theeconometric model, in which
everything can be decided by three or four variables,and the real world, in
which a host of economic and political realities determinesthe outcome of
trade balances. The current projections are also basedupon the world
economy's ability to intelligently solve the majorinternational financial
crisis generated by the rapid shiftin world monetaryresources.If not,
Japan's ability to withstand the high oil price will beeven less than itis
today, and unlike the United States, Japan's abilityto minimize the crisis
through "Project Independence" isnil.
Growth-inhibiting Effects of Increased
Social Welfare
If the budgets of the last few years are indicative of the changesto come,
the government will of political necessity be forcedto allocate more and
more national resources to welfare measures, antipollution programs, and
other "nonproductive" projects. And given the mostrecent election results,
nonproductive expenditures will rise muchmore sharply than has been
anticipated. This change, desirableas itis socially, cannot but increase the
difficulty of attaining the projected growth rate. The LDP will be forcedto
decide during the comingyears between economic growth and political
stability (i.e., the ability of the LDP to remain in power). Unlike the early
1960s when the demand for welfareprograms and antipollution measures
was still muffled by rapidly increasing real income and the consumption
boom for the three C's (i.e.,car, color TV, and room cooler), the situation
in 1974 is significantly different, andone can safely assume that public
demands will becomemore intense during the years to come. Such
changes in the public attitude will havea much more profound effect on
the Japaneseeconomy than in the United States where the two major
political parties essentially share thesame basic political ideology.
There are a few other related factors thatare expected to slow the growth
of the Japaneseeconomy. One is the expected gradual decline in the rate
of technological change.Though itis possible for the rate of change to
accelerate, for reasons whichwe cannot now anticipate,such a possibility
is small. In fact,even the possibility of the slowly (andrnonotonically)declining rate of technological change usually assumed in econometric
projections being borne out in the future is at best 50-50 or perhaps less
because of a possible more rapid decline in the rate of technological
change. Another factor is the more rapid decline in savings because of
inflation (and evidence to this effect is appearing), slower increases in real
income, and the changing attitudes of the public (especially the young)
toward the future. If social welfare programs are increased, this too could
cause savings to decline.
The above discussion of possible growth-inhibiting factors is in no way
exhaustive, hut these factors alone suggest that the future growth rate of the
Japanese economy will be slower than that currently projected by many.
Data for the years 1973 and 1974 alone are sufIicieiit to show that growth
is now running seriously behind the projections. The statistical loss in the
g'nwth rate does not necessarily represent a loss to most Japanese. Our
pointre is simply that the Japanese economy will almost certainly grow
more slowly ;the future than the rate currently projected.
It is worth bearing in mind that if anyone had attempted to speculateon
the course of the Japanese economy any time between 1860 and 1950 for
more than a few decades into the future, his chance of making a re-
spectable forecast would have been virtually nil. With the Meiji Restora-
tion, the beginning of the rapid industrialization during the 1880s, the First
World War boom and its aftermath, the recession-ridden 1920s and the
Great Depression, the Second World War and the postwar growth, fore-
casting the future of the Japanese economy has not beeneasy, to say the
least, and the task is no easier in 1975. There is, however,a Japanese
quality which could surface again to aid the optimists, that is, theJapanese
have managed to make the most of the little they have and haveshown
themselves to thrive on adversity. Unity of the spirit,or the spirit of "Japan,
Inc." in the good sense of the phrase, could surfaceagain to surprise us all.
I am quite willing to be surprised.
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i.In addition to the authors referred to in [61] and(30], see [125].
See Masao Baba's article in [30].
There are numerous works on the dualstructure. The more useful among them are (10]
[39] (98] [133) (1611.
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Discussant:Leon Hollerman, ClaremontMen's College
Hollerman shared Yamamura'spessmism about the future ofthe Japanese
284 IKozo Ynian)uraeconomy, especiallyfor the long run, noting theextensive assortment of
problems facing Japan. Furthermore, he suggested that the transition which
her ecoflOnlY is curiently undergoing is important and basic for the entire
Pacific Basin region and therefore deserving of scholarly attention.
yamamura's paper presented an excellent summary of the variousex-
planations for Japan's successful economic development; yet Hollerman
argued that these explanations are still subject to debate. For example, Was
Japan's growth export-led? And in an historical context, What was the
relative importance of saving and investment, the dual economy structure,
and foreign technology?
Yamamura had cited the growth analysis of Rosovsky and Ohkawa. In
their analysis of the postwar period, they found that the increase in capital
and labor stocks accounted for only two-thirds of Japan's economic
growth, and they attributed the large residual to improvements in technol-
ogy. Hollerman, however, contended that Rosovsky and Ohkawa had
erred, for the capital stock is computed on a vintage basis and implicitly
accounts for technological advance.
Hollerman also questioned Rosovsky and Ohkawa's conclusion that the
high volume of Japanese exports was attributable to rapid economic
growth, rather than vice versa. In any event, however, Hollerman sug-
gested that foreign trade may constrain future economic growth, since
Japan's ability to grow will depend on her success in obtaining food and
raw rnaterialss from the rest of the world.
As a concomitant of "resource diplomacy," Japan will try to diversify her
sources of supply so as to minimize her dependence on anysingle trading
partner, with the result that she will become much more dependent on the
diversification of foreign trade and foreign investment. And since approxi-
mately two-thirds of Japanese trade is conducted with Pacific Basin coun-
tries, the importance of this region for Japan is obvious.
Hollerman was less sanguine about Japan's long-term prospects. He
reasoned that since regionalism and protectionism are likely to become
more accentuated, the Japanese competitive positionwill be less depen-
dent on price and quality than on an ability to specialize and secure
market-sharing agreements. As a result, while there will behorizontal trade
with the other rich Pacific Basin countries, Japan will also develop corn-
plenientary relationships with the region's LDCs, where plantand equip-
ment are exchanged for raw materials. In either case,though, problems
relating to bilateral deficits are likely to spread, and the associatedpolitical
difficulties will be compounded as well.
Hollerman concluded by observing that Japan now has a greatervested
interest in liberalized trade. Indeed, itis ironic that whereas Japanhas been
criticized for unduly regulating trade and investmentflows, she has now
emerged as "the champion of free trade."
Robert S. Einzig wondered if such a position could beall that beneficial
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for Japanese economic growthprospects. After all,ifall countriesare
similarly trying to expand theirexports in the face of slowly expanding
markets, rapid export growth forany given country would be unlikely.
Yamamura concurred, and felt that despitethe optimistic predictions of the
majority of economists, a sustained 6percent growth in exports is the best
that could be hoped for.
Richard Kjeklsen expressedconcern about the Japanese balance-of
payments figures, and argued that thereare more fundamental difficulties
in Japan's external balance thanare revealed by the numbers. For a more
thorough analysis,one would need to consider Japanese controlsover the
capital account as wellas the autonomous nature of Arabian capital
m ovenlents.
Lawrence J. Lau wondered if therecent layoffs in Japan representeda
break from the traditionalpractice of lifetime employment, and ifso,
whether this might alter workincentives and lead to a switch of laborfrom
cyclical to less cyclical industries.Yamamura felt that the layoffswere only
a transient problem and that the labor shortageover the long run would
persist. Moreover, those who had beenfired were only the temporarily
employed anyway, and thus the layoffswould have no effecton corporate
loyalty. Rather, Yamamurare-emphasized his point from thepaper that
future economic growth willmore likely be affected by the changing
attitudes of the younger generation.
On the other hand, Walter Yepquestioned whether even pasteconomic
growth had been all that successful.Needless to say, the rapid increasein GNP had not been withoutassociated increases in environmentalproblems
and social unrest. Yamamuracountered by saying that the nationalwelfare had improved since; forexample, more Japaneseare enjoying a larger
variety of consumer durablesand taking more trips.Furthermore, since the
1960s, the net national welfareindex, which adjusts the GNPfor the costs of correcting pollution andcongestion, has risen. Hollermanwas suspi- cious about the net nationalwelfare figures, however, forhe noted that they were closely correlatedwith the GNP data.
Regarding the observedincrease in the Japanese GNP,Paul A. David
expanded on Hollerman's critiqueof the Rosovsky-Ohkawagrowth analy- sis. First of all, he stated thatthe deceleration inJapan's economic growth could have been predicted,for much of the initialgrowth was attributable to a catch-up in technology.Secondly, Davidsuggested that part of the residual could be explainedby reformulating theproduction function. In particular, let:
(1) Q = f(L,K. Al),
where
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Kozo YamarnuraQ = outputof nonagricultural sector
L = input of labor
Kinput of capital
Minputs drawn from the rest of the world--i.e., materials "imported"
from the agricultural sector and other countries.
Furthermore, if the rate of growth is denoted by an asterisk, R represents
the residual term, and O indicates the share of the total output or cost
accounted for by the ith input, then:
(2R + + OkK4- OmM*
By further assuming that M/Q = kthat is, that the rate of growth of
material imports is proportional to the rate of growth of output(2) may be
written as:
Q* = R* + 0,L* + kK + OmQ*
If the U.S. figure for 0m = 1/3, then, since the Japanese economy grew at
13percentperyearduringtheperiod1955-1961,adjusted
Q* = 0.13- (1/3) 0.13.
Hence, approximately 4.3 of the thirteen percentage points canbe
accounted for by the growth in material imports. Consequentlythe residual
that must be accounted for is smallerabout 2.5 percentrather than the
6.75 percent which Rosovsky and Ohkawahad computed.
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